Institutional Oversight of Faculty-Industry Consulting Relationships in U.S. Medical Schools: A Delphi Study.

Abstract

The conflicts of interest that may arise in relationships between academic researchers and industry continue to prompt controversy. The bulk of attention has focused on financial aspects of these relationships, but conflicts may also arise in the legal obligations that faculty acquire through consulting contracts. However, oversight of faculty members' consulting agreements is far less vigorous than for financial conflicts, creating the potential for faculty to knowingly or unwittingly contract away important rights and freedoms. Increased regulation could prevent this, but it is unclear what forms of oversight universities view as feasible and effective. In this article, we report on a Delphi study to evaluate several approaches for oversight of consulting agreements by medical schools. The panel was comprised of 11 senior administrators with responsibility for oversight of faculty consulting relationships. We found broad agreement among panelists regarding the importance of institutional oversight to protect universities' interests. There was strong support for two specific approaches: providing educational resources to faculty and submitting consulting agreements for institutional review. Notwithstanding the complexities of asserting authority to regulate private consulting agreements between faculty members and companies, medical school administrators reached consensus that several approaches to improving institutional oversight are feasible and useful.