Institutional Failure and Civic Activism: The Potential for Democratic Control in Post-Maidan Ukraine

Abstract

With only a handful of civilian ministers of defense since independence and a set of scant and feebly implemented institutions, civilian democratic control remains a weak spot in Ukraine’s security and defense architecture. Largely unrestricted by institutions other than the executive and un-scrutinized by the wider public, after the country’s independence in 1991 the armed forces became a source of patronage and rent-seeking for top officials. The proliferation of corruption schemes hollowed them from within, undermined their effectiveness, alienated them from the general public and created a widespread crisis of confidence. The unexpected eruption of war in the Donbas in 2014 raised concerns that undertrained, underequipped and underfunded as it was, the Ukrainian army would be unable to protect the country’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. This chapter examines the impact of the Maidan demonstrations and their aftermath on good governance practices in the security sector within the context of Ukraine’s incomplete and often faltering democratic transition. The main argument is that while the effectiveness of the armed forces depends on the existence of mechanisms that enhance their accountability, in order to have a meaningful impact, civilian oversight needs to be truly democratic. In other words, it needs to allow for the participation of a variety of both institutional and extra-institutional actors, each according to their specific competence and mandate. Limiting civilian control to a handful of institutional insiders, instead, risks creating bonds of loyalty towards a restricted elite rather than the state at large. Lack of transparency and the preservation of rent-seeking and patronage practices undermine the efficiency of the armed forces and weaken their capacity to defend the state and its collective interests.