Institutional effects on information content of US and French management earnings forecasts: Evidence from market reactions and analyst revisions

Abstract

Abstract The United States and France are both most developed economies in the world. Their socio-economic institutions, however, are very different. These differences are indications of their dichotomous legal regimes: common law in the US versus code law in France. The political influence of these legal regimes, in turn, leads to a dichotomized classification of accounting systems: the British–American Model and the French Continental Model. This study extends these institutional effects into the field of management earnings forecast. We find that earnings forecasts by French firms are less informative than those made by US firms matched-up by industry and firm size. We also compare US and French financial analysts' revisions of their forecasts following the management forecasts. We find that revisions by French analysts are more influenced by management forecasts. Our findings are consistent with prior studies that argue that information asymmetry in code-law countries is largely resolved through private information channels, rendering less information content in management announcements and less demand and incentives for original research by financial analysts.