Abstract
Implications from three theoretical models explaining the incidence of invalid voting are tested using data from all presidential elections in post-communist and Latin American democracies. Institutions such as the rule governing the possibility of reelection, compulsory voting, the rule for electing presidents, and the concurrence of elections, all powerfully shape the incidence of invalid voting. The article utilizes an interactive framework which implies that the effect of electoral rules is strongly conditioned by features of political competition. Although there is evidence consistent both with the voter error and protest models of invalid voting, most of the variation in invalid voting rates is explicable by the stakes associated with casting a valid as opposed to an invalid ballot.
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