Abstract

Community based fishery management (CBFM) formulates various formal and informal institutions (developing community organizations, decision-making, and traditional fishing rules) for sustainable fishery management in Bangladesh. Although these rules are intended to managing fisheries for a long-term use, constraints to enforcing these rules or absence of mechanisms to address these constraints hamper fishers’ resilience. This paper aims to examine such constraints to fishers’ resilience in Langalkata Ozurbeel (local name of the fishery), Sunamganj, Bangladesh. Based on key informant interviews, this paper finds that non-participatory community based organizations and weak coordination among stakeholders appear to be enduring constraints to developing fishers’ resilience. Fishers’ resilience is largely constrained by power relations that mostly exclude fishers from the fishery management. Conflict between fishery users or with the community and the absence of interactive learning are also important constraints to fishers’ resilience. It seems that rules-in-practice fail to develop fishers’ capacity to cope and adapt to these constraints and continue their activities to maintaining the fishery.

Highlights

  • The fishing right of fishers in inland fisheries is not yet established in Bangladesh

  • The management of the fisheries requires the formation of a Beel user group (BUG) – fishery users association – and a Beel management committee (BMC), a nine-member decision-making body for two years

  • Formal rules force fishers to work together, while informal interactions between Beel (fishery) user group (BUG) and BMC members bring them closer to negotiate with other stakeholders and community members to administer the fishery

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Summary

Introduction

The fishing right of fishers in inland fisheries is not yet established in Bangladesh. More recent studies reveal that fishers’ rights in inland fisheries is largely restricted by the conventional leasing procedures designed to handover inland fisheries to the top rent payers through an auction for a three-year period (Khan et al 2016; Mamun et al 2016). Such procedures allow well-off and powerful leaseholders to capture fisheries, and to employ professional fishers for fishing (Thompson et al 2003; Islam et al 2014). According to Folke (2006), to develop institutions combining various views, motives, and learning arises as a lasting problem to developing stakeholders’ adaptability and transformability in an SES

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