Institutional constraints on legislative lobbying: The case of Indian casino advocacy in New York

Abstract

Prevailing theory holds that lobbyists primarily lobby their legislative allies, yet the literatures on advocacy and legislative organization suggest that we should not always expect this to be true. Institution design gives some legislators disproportionately greater power, and jurisdictional requirements often create a contentious environment forcing lobbyists to lobby their ideological opponents. Drawing on these literatures, I revise the basic lobbying model to predict conditions where we might expect to see advocates lobby their foes. I test my hypotheses with data on campaign contributions made in New York on the contentious issue of American Indian gambling casinos. I find that while advocates often lobbied their allies, they were more likely to contribute heavily to legislative leaders regardless of position, and often even contributed to rank-and-file opponents as the environment became more competitive. I also find some evidence that this was different for Indian nations, who may have employed a more naïve advocacy strategy than more traditional interest groups.