Abstract
The European Union's policy in the Mediterranean suffers from a gap between its apparent potential to act and its actual performance. This discrepancy can be explained in part by the particular institutional and procedural constraints of the Union's ‘dual’ system of foreign affairs. These constraints make the Union a clearing‐house for national interests rather than a unitary actor, they lead to an in‐built tilt towards economic measures and they create difficulties for its partners in terms of transparency and predictability. Cases such as the implementation of the Euro‐Mediterranean Partnership, the association agreement with Jordan of 1997 and financial co‐operation with Turkey all demonstrate the limitations that the system imposes on the Union's Mediterranean policy decision‐making and implementation.
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