Institutional Change and Ecological Economics: The Role of Mental Models and Sufficient Reason

Abstract

Paavola and Adger (2005) claim that ecological economics could benefit from institutional economics when analysing environmental governance. One aspect they focus on is the discussion about motivational and cognitive assumptions in institutional economics. This paper deepens this focus, explaining in theoretical terms what it means to include cognition in our institutional analysis and presenting the main theoretical approaches on this topic within institutional economics. A short comparison is made between two approaches, one by Douglass North and the other by Daniel Bromley. The paper argues that, even if traditionally the differences between the old and the new institutionalisms have been substantial, in relation to recent developments they are becoming a lot closer. Especially if we compare the role of mental models as seen by Douglass North with the arguments made by Daniel Bromley about sufficient reason, the two approaches can be seen as complementary and could fructify each other. Particularly if we draw the methodological implications of these two theoretical approaches, we see that both require the use of qualitative data in order to understand mental models or forms of sufficient reason. Some qualitative data is used to demonstrate what it means to apply the approaches empirically.