Institutional Arrangements to Determine Loan Repayment in Chile

Abstract

The major objective of this paper is to investigate institutional arrangements as a determinant of loan repayment in the Chilean financial market. A second aim is to analyze the effects of these arrangements on borrowers’ behavior. Although La Porta et al. (1997, 1998) classify Chile as a French Civil Law country, the law and private arrangements have evolved consistently with the capital market development to protect the rights of the creditors. This is consistent with relatively low rates of bad loans, ranking from 1. 1 to 2. 0 percent in 1993-1997. We examine different variables which may be related to loan repayment: (a) limitations on the access to credit, (b) macroeconomic stability, (c) collection technology, (d) bankruptcy code, (e) information sharing, (f) the judicial system, (g) prescreening techniques and (h) major changes in financial market regulation. Based on the discussion presented in the paper plus regression analyses, we conclude that a satisfactory performance of the Chilean credit market, in terms of loan repayments and credit market development, hinges on a good information sharing system, an advanced collection technology, a good macroeconomic performance, credit market development and major changes in financial market regulation.