Abstract
We argue and demonstrate empirically that institutional and political economy considerations have first-order effects in tests that use state antitakeover laws for identification. A priori, the size and direction of a law’s effect on a firm’s takeover protection depends on (i) other state antitakeover laws, (ii) pre-existing firm-level takeover defenses, and (iii) the legal regime as reflected in important court decisions. In addition, (iv) state antitakeover laws are identifiably not exogenous for many firms. We show that the inferences from nine prior studies relating to nine different outcome variables change substantially when we include controls for these considerations.
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
