Abstract

Recent experiments in semiotics and linguistics demonstrate that groups tend to converge on a common set of signs or terms in response to presented problems, experiments which potentially bear on the emergence and establishment of institutional interactions. Taken together, these studies indicate a spectrum, ranging from the spontaneous convergence of communicative practices to their eventual conventionalization, a process which might be described as an implicit institutionalization of those practices. However, the emergence of such convergence and conventionalization does not in itself constitute an institution, in the strict sense of a social organization partly created and governed by explicit rules. A further step toward institutions proper may occur when others are instructed about a task. That is, given task situations which select for successful practices, instructions about such situations make explicit what was tacit practice, instructions which can then be followed correctly or incorrectly. This transition gives rise to the normative distinction between conditions of success versus conditions of correctness, a distinction which will be explored and complicated in the course of this paper. Using these experiments as a basis, then, the emergence of institutions will be characterized in evolutionary and normative terms, beginning with our adaptive responses to the selective pressures of certain situational environments, and continuing with our capacity to then shape, constrain, and institute those environments to further refine and streamline our problem-solving activity.

Highlights

  • Institutions, understood as societal structures constituted and governed, at least in part, by explicit rules, presuppose a language in which such rules can be formulated and expressed (Searle, 2005, 2010)

  • A broadly evolutionary framework guides much of this work, with semiotic and linguistic communication conceived as adapting to environmental conditions

  • These experiments demonstrate that interacting participants, jointly solving a problem, often in the guise of a game, are acutely sensitive to the selective pressures of the situation at hand, converging on common communicative practices and vocabularies without explicit deliberation or decision concerning these practices (Garrod and Doherty, 1994; Fay et al, 2008; Mills, 2011)

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Summary

INTRODUCTION

Institutions, understood as societal structures constituted and governed, at least in part, by explicit rules, presuppose a language in which such rules can be formulated and expressed (Searle, 2005, 2010). A broadly evolutionary framework guides much of this work, with semiotic and linguistic communication conceived as adapting to environmental conditions These experiments demonstrate that interacting participants, jointly solving a problem, often in the guise of a game, are acutely sensitive to the selective pressures of the situation at hand, converging on common communicative practices and vocabularies without explicit deliberation or decision concerning these practices (Garrod and Doherty, 1994; Fay et al, 2008; Mills, 2011). A particular situational environment, defined by a particular problem or set of problems, calls forth and selects for communicative practices fit for that situation This basic dynamic of fecund generation of communicative forms and their functional selection may be viewed as an engine of specialization, spurring and honing the specialized vocabularies characteristic of specific disciplines. We claim that linguistic interaction within these situations www.frontiersin.org

Elias and Tylén
CONCLUSION
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