Abstract
What is it, metaphysically, for a universal to be instantiated in a concrete particular? Philosophical controversy has been ongoing since the beginning of philosophy itself. I here contribute a novel account of instantiation developed on the basis of Aristotelian premises (but departing from the mainstream interpretation according to which Aristotelian universals are instantiated by ‘combining’ hylomorphically with matter). The key stance is that for Aristotle each substance is one, i.e. single (in addition to also being a non-recurrent particular). I show that for Aristotle, the oneness of substances is primitively assumed, and, importantly, cannot be derived from composition of parts, not even holistic composition. Parts undermine oneness. It follows that instantiated properties are <em>not parts</em> of substances. However, if not parts of the substances they are in, what are they? Aristotle shows they are <em>qualifications</em> of the substances they are in. Don’t qualifications undermine the singleness of a substance? I show that Aristotle makes sure they do not. The way he does it is new, then and now. Instantiated properties are ‘hybrid’ entities: they sacrifice their own discreteness <em>qua</em> properties, while adopting the discreteness of the metaphysical subject they qualify, i.e. the substance. But then, how can a universal quality recur in many substances, if, when instantiated, it assimilates the discreteness of each of these substances? This is a key Aristotelian stance: <em>the quality recurs, not its qualifications</em>. Qualities are abstracted from their instances in similar objects, e.g. ‘wisdom’ is abstracted from many ‘wise’ people; ‘wisdom’ is individuated bottom-up from its instances, by abstraction.
Highlights
A TIMELESS CHALLENGEIf concrete particulars are qualified in certain ways and resemble each other qualitatively in certain respects because there are universal properties that are in some sense ‘in’ them, the crux is how to understand what being ‘instantiated’ in concrete particulars amounts to, metaphysically
I here contribute a novel account of instantiation developed on the basis of Aristotelian premises
Try to conceptualize two objects that resemble one another with respect to e.g. shape, but share nothing in common. How do they differ from two objects that do not resemble each other shapewise? The far insurmountable difficulty of providing an answer to this question indicates that either qualitative resemblance is to be treated as a brute fact, without explanation, which is unsatisfactory, or something has to be added to the ontology that resembling objects share
Summary
If concrete particulars are qualified in certain ways and resemble each other qualitatively in certain respects because there are universal properties that are in some sense ‘in’ them, the crux is how to understand what being ‘instantiated’ in concrete particulars amounts to, metaphysically. I share, with many others, Sider’s dissatisfaction with this understanding of instantiated properties as constituents, when constituency is explained only in terms of the broad notion of ontological dependence It seems that both Aristotle’s approach as traditionally understood, and the existing modern developments of it, are unsatisfactory in explaining the instantiation of universals. Costa’s paper surveys a number of versions of the interpretation that instantiation is a relation and their respective weaknesses This is not Lowe’s own position, but what matters for present purposes is the understanding he offers of the instantiation of Aristotelian universals
Sign-in/Register to view highlights & summary Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Free) 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a call
