Abstract
The effectiveness of the insider ownership as an internal governance mechanism is addressed in the Southern European context using a sample of publicly traded firms during the 2001-2007 periods. A cross country and panel data design is used, taking into account the endogeneity problem arising in studies of corporate governance. The results provide new evidence of the influence of the insider ownership on firm value by testing a non-linear relationship. Our study supports both the convergence of interests and the entrenchment effect. It also shows whether there are significant differences in the estimated relationship between family and non-family firms. We find that when the large shareholder has not a family nature, firm value initially declines with insider ownership, then increases, and, finally, increases again. However, when the large shareholder has a family nature, firm value initially increases with insider ownership and then decreases
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
