Inside Out or Outside In: Domestic and International Factors Affecting Iranian Foreign Policy Towards the United States 1990–2004

Abstract

This article tests three theories of state behavior with reference to Iran’s interactions with the United States between 1990 and the end of 2004. The study evaluates whether the Iranians alter their foreign policy in response to domestic instability, as proposed by the Diversionary Theory of War, whether the Iranians become more cooperative with the United States when the U.S. President is unpopular or the U.S. economy is underperforming, as proposed by the theory of Strategic Conflict Avoidance and finally whether the European Union, Russia and China can influence Iranian behavior toward the United States through either coercion or engagement. These theories are tested on two time-series of data pre and post the invasion of Iraq in order to assess whether Iranian behavior toward the United States has been affected by the ongoing U.S. occupation of Iraq. The analysis suggests that domestic instability decreases rather than increases Iranian aggression toward the United States, as the regime in Tehran tries to deal with internal difficulties. The results also suggest that the Iranians become more cooperative with the U.S. when the U.S. economy is performing badly supporting the theory of Strategic Conflict Avoidance. The study indicates that the United States, China, and the European Union are able to influence the behavior of the Iranian regime. Finally, the study suggests that the Iranians have tended to exploit the difficulties that the United States is facing in Iraq becoming more hostile toward the United States when President George Bush is unpopular.