Insensitivity to Unethical Behavior in Decision Making when Indirectly Intermediated

Abstract

The indirect involvement in the unethical behavior represented by violation of regulation is believed to lessen the responsibility for the accident occurred due to the unethical behavior as compared to the direct involvement in the unethical behavior. It has been explored how punishment changes when violation of rule or defection is committed indirectly in decision making. It was hypothesized that we tend to be insensitive to violation, defection, or unethical behavior in decision making when it was indirectly intermediated. In other words, we explored whether allowing indirect actions leads to increased uncooperative decision in decision making. These results mean that the punishment to the indirectness does not always get smaller. The punishment to the indirectness gets smaller only when the reward by Players B and D are larger. In conclusion, the hypothesis that the indirect intermediation reduces the punishment and thus lessons the responsibility for the unethical violation behavior is true for the limited condition.