Abstract
Abstract This chapter closely examines Aristotle’s account of inquiry in Posterior Analytics 2.2. It discusses Aristotle’s claim that when one searches for any of the four objects of inquiry introduced in Posterior Analytics 2.1 (‘the fact that’, ‘the reason why’, ‘if it is’, ‘what it is’), one is (ideally) seeking a ‘middle term’ (i.e., a cause). The distinction made in the previous chapter between subject- and attribute-focused inquiries is examined in light of Aristotle’s claim about the middle term. A further distinction is drawn between two types of essence for which one might seek: causally complex essences (of the form A–C because of B), which belong to demonstrable attributes; and causally simple essences (of the form GD1…Dn), which belong to ‘subject-kinds’ (i.e., species and genera). The chapter also discusses an instance of Meno’s Paradox that arises from Aristotle’s account of inquiry in Posterior Analytics 2.2.
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