Inquiries into Classical Chinese Logic

Abstract

SINCE THE PERIOD of the May Fourth Movement in 1919, it has been an unsettled question in contemporary Chinese philosophy whether Chinese thought possesses a in the Aristotelian sense, and, if not, whether it has its own distinctive logic. Indeed, many have suggested that the ancient Chinese School of Names had little to do with strict logic, and, consequently, pay no attention to the principles of arguments and methods of reasoning used by that school. On the other hand, there are a few who claim that Chinese philosophy has its own unique concern, but they use the word logic or logical in such a broad sense that analytical understanding of Chinese thought is impossible. Both of these extreme views commit the twofold crime of vagueness and generality. For whether Chinese thought in the classical period contained contributions in in the Aristotelian or Western sense or in a unique Chinese way depends upon how we define contributions. In this regard, we understand that there is no non-equivocal understanding even of Aristotelian logic. It has been frequently pointed out that the form of the Aristotelian syllogism in many modem texts is not the same as that found in Aristotle's Prior Analytics.1 In fact, much of what we find in Aristotle's De Interpretatione and Categories does not belong to the theory of inference, but belongs, rather, to theories of categories and predications which are important, nevertheless, in the development of Aristotelian logic. It is true that Chinese thought does not present an over-all explicit formulation of all laws of reasoning, nor does it evolve into a system of useful symbolism for the purpose of abstract thinking.2 It is true, further, that until