Abstract
We study the welfare effects of input price discrimination when an upstream firm that supplies two cost-asymmetric downstream firms undertakes RD but it always decreases long-run welfare. Thus, with unobservable two-part tariffs, a ban on input price discrimination is detrimental to welfare even when its effect on upstream R&D investments is positive.
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