Innovation Cooperation Network Evolution About Green Building Technology With Government Intervention: Based on Evolutionary Game Theory

Abstract

Green building technologies (GBTs) are becoming increasingly complex and are being rapidly updated. These factors lead to an inherent demand for GBT innovation cooperation. This article considers the common policy instruments of the Chinese government and builds a GBT innovation cooperation network by joint patent applications. Then, evolutionary game models are constructed based on the GBT innovation cooperation network. Numerical simulation is employed to analyze the impact of different policy intervention intensities on the decision-making behavior of enterprises and network structures. The results show that government intervention is reasonable and legitimate for GBT innovation cooperation. Subsidies, preferential tax policy, and intellectual property protection are the main policy instruments of the Chinese government. When subsidies and preferential tax policy exceed certain thresholds, network efficiency and network cooperation density can be improved. In addition, the simulation results show that green building intellectual property protection in China has difficulty stimulating the enthusiasm of GBT innovation enterprises. GBT innovation cooperation network efficiency and network cooperation density evolution trends are basically the same. This study also provides insights into government policy formulation and adds to the increasing literature on the topic of GBT innovation cooperation. It is one of the few studies to explore the impact of government policy instruments on GBT innovation cooperation.