Abstract

We investigate the impact of state ownership on the innovativeness of European listed firms. We find that state-owned enterprises (SOEs) invest more in R&D than private firms, thanks to easier access to bank financing. However, SOEs controlled by politicians with electoral concerns and SOEs with politically appointed managers invest no more than private firms. On the output side, SOEs produce fewer patents per dollar invested. We also find evidence that government-controlled SOEs produce patents with more citations, oriented towards sustainable-technologies, but with lower commercial value, consistent with the view that they emphasize innovation with public good characteristics over commercial returns.

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