Abstract
The present paper extends previous work on predatory behavior against financially constrained firms (e.g. Bolton and Scharfstein (1990)) to include innovation and product market competition. I show that the pattern of strategic interaction between competing firms determines behavioral changes coming from financial constraints. Both leveraged and unleveraged firms react to financial constraints. The theory is used to explain recent empirical findings concerning the interaction of capital market imperfections and market structure.
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