Abstract
Currently the terms rights is and human rights are used to refer to two types of entities. One is a kind of legal claim or guarantee given in positive law. The other is a purported moral claim or interest implicit in the nature of human persons. A peculiar feature of modem discussions of rights is that these diverse things are commonly treated as if they had some necessary relation to one another. In fact, historically and conceptually, they do not and the frequent attempts to relate them can have inimical results. It can confuse substantive human rights with the promulgation of an individualist view of the person. The defence of human rights (of the types now mentioned in international treaties) would be helped by divorcing these from a notion of innate rights and, instead, understanding rights as legal guarantees of just political relations.
Highlights
INTRODUCnONIn the world today and more especially, in South Africa today the most com mon way of ad d re ssin g n o rm a tiv e issu es in p o litic s is by m ean s o f th e o r ie s o f rights
The terms rif^is and hum an rights are used to refer to two types o f entities
The defence ofhuman rights ( o f the types n o w m entioned in international treaties) w o u ld be h elped by divorcing these fro m a notion o f innate rights and, instead, understanding rights as legal guarantees o fju st political relations
Summary
In the world today and more especially, in South Africa today the most com mon way of ad d re ssin g n o rm a tiv e issu es in p o litic s is by m ean s o f th e o r ie s o f rights. "Positive rights" are claim s guaranteed to p eo p le in positive law and capable o f sustaining a legal appeal This d istin ction is hardly a subtle one and, whatever their diverse views on other matters, most com m entators expressly point it out. What happens is not that people assume that these two types of rights are identical but that they assume that they necessarily have a close connection Those who are, very correctly, concerned with the protection of human rights in positive law often, very incorrectly, assume that such protection can only be justified by or, at least, needs to be ju stified by, or should be justified by som e conception o f innate rights.
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