Innate ideas in Stoicism and Grotius

Abstract

Philosophers have long debated whether any ideas are innate in the human mind and if so, what they might be. The issues here are real and important but it often seems that the discussion of them isn’t. One of the main reasons that these discussions are frequently so frustrating is that the various sides seem to be talking past each other rather than engaging in genuine argument. When this happens, it seems to me that it is usually because the issues they are discussing have not been formulated clearly enough. To avoid that problem and also to motivate what follows, I want to begin with an overview of some philosophical concepts and questions before I get to the historical part of my paper. The first point to make is a distinction between two types of innatist theories, according to what they hold is actually innate.1 The first type of theory, which we may call ‘content’ innatism, argues that it is individual instances of knowledge or belief or concepts or behaviour which are innate. Without any experience or effort, this theory maintains, all of us know or believe certain propositions or have some concepts or behaviourisms. Supporters of this theory have disagreed over the moment when the innate items enter our soul: some think they predate our existence here on earth while others do not.2 This dispute, however, is less important than their shared opinion that our souls possess knowledge or beliefs or concepts or behaviourisms of which experience, at best, only serves to make us aware.