Abstract
Conspiracy theories are widespread and have a profound impact on society. The present contribution proposes that conspiracy theories are explanatory narratives that necessarily contain justice judgments, as they include attributions of blame and accusations of unethical or criminal conduct. Conspiratorial narratives also are mental simulations, however, and may elicit genuine feelings of injustice also without evidence of actual malpractice. Indeed, conspiracy theories sometimes describe unfair events that are unlikely to have occurred, unethical authorities that might not actually exist, and so on. Here I propose two complementary processes that stimulate belief in evidence-free conspiracy theories: (1) Existential threats instigate biased mental processing and motivated reasoning, that jointly promote an alternative perception of reality; and (2) group allegiances shape how people perceive, interpret, and remember facts to highlight the immoral qualities of competing outgroups. Due to these processes, conspiracy theories elicit a set of distinct reactions such as poor health choices and rejection of science. Moreover, evidence-free conspiracy theories require interventions beyond traditional approaches to install justice principles, such as debunking falsehoods and reducing polarized intergroup distinctions. I conclude that the scientific study of conspiracy theories is part of, and has a unique place in, social justice research.
Highlights
When an angry crowd of Trump supporters stormed Capitol Hill on 6 January 2021, it was clear that they were motivated by a deeply felt sense of injustice
I propose that two interrelated psychological processes stimulate belief in evidence-free conspiracy theories: (1) an epistemic sense-making process that is triggered by existential threats; and (2) group allegiances, in particular an evolved tendency to blame existential threats on the covert actions of hostile coalitions
This contribution sought to illuminate that conspiracy theories include justice judgments, as conspiratorial narratives ascribe blame and make assumptions of unethical behavior committed by other groups
Summary
When an angry crowd of Trump supporters stormed Capitol Hill on 6 January 2021, it was clear that they were motivated by a deeply felt sense of injustice. Many of the rioters were part of the so-called Qanon movement that promulgates a set of conspiracy theories alleging that President Trump is fighting a secret war against an evil Democratic “deep-state”, and that includes accusations of satanic rituals and sexual abuse of children among prominent members of the Democratic party. While actual corruption and conspiracies do occur, in politics (e.g., Watergate; the Iran-contra scandal), business (e.g., the Volkswagen Diesel scandal), the media (e.g., the BBC misleading Princess Diana to give an interview), and many other settings, without any evidence of true malpractice people experience a genuine sense of injustice through conspiratorial accusations. Conspiracy theories are largely based on group allegiances: The mere existence of an outgroup that one distrusts or despises is enough for people to make unfounded assumptions of severely unethical behavior taking place in secret (Van Prooijen, 2020). I will illuminate what psychological processes stimulate belief in evidence-free conspiracy theories, and how this gives conspiracy beliefs a unique place in social justice research
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