Inherently Particularistic? How China’s Identity Constrains its Ability to Wield Soft Power

Abstract

Does China’s identity affect its attractiveness to the outside world? Although many China scholars seem to subscribe to this view, few have attempted to explore and theorise the relation directly. This article argues that to fully understand China’s (in)ability to wield soft power on the international stage, it is necessary to identify the underlying discursive structures, or building blocks, of China’s national identity. Based on an extensive reading of the secondary literature, the article singles out four relatively distinct discursive building blocks—“Sino-civilization”, “Confucianism”, the “Century of Humiliation” and the “Communist March”—each of which is critical to the articulation of Chinese identity in the 21st century. Following a description of these building blocks, this article shows, by examining a selection of public speeches by Xi Jinping, how the discursive building blocks have enabled and constrained the official narrative construction of China’s national identity. Against this backdrop, it is argued that China’s national identity is predominantly particularistic, or Sino-centric, and that this particularism places serious limitations on China’s soft power potential.