Abstract

Firms in the LDCs need to adopt and indigenize transferred technology before usage. The adoption costs depend on the state of the infrastructure and on the localized spillover effects generated by a rival firm. In this context, the paper examines the timing of such technological adoption. It shows that strategic decisions regarding time may result in a waiting game where, in equilibrium, the efficient firm prefers to adopt after its less efficient rival, thus delaying the speed of technology transfer. The paper also shows that under certain conditions, technology transfer may not take place within the planning horizon. [01, LI, Fl ]

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