Abstract
Abstract Discusses models of information. Blackwells theorem in garbling and the value of information is proved. Monotonicity of decisions in signals is considered and related to supermodularity of the pay-off function and monotone likelihood ratio. Rational expectations equilibrium is discussed and existence of rational expectations equilibrium considered. Finally, equilibrium in abstract games of incomplete information is considered.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
