Information versus adverse Anlegerbeeinflussung: Befund und Implikationen der empirischen Rechnungswesenforschung zur Publizität von Pro-forma-Ergebnisgrößen

Abstract

Pro forma earnings represent voluntarily disclosed performance metrics that modify the mandatory (GAAP) income number. Motives discussed to explain this disclosure phenomenon are to increase the informativeness of earnings (information), or to influence investors in an adverse fashion (opportunism). The objective of this paper is to survey the extant US and German literature pertaining to pro forma earnings disclosures, with a special emphasis on the ensuing regulatory discussion, to point out promising avenues for future research. Extant studies, on the one hand, demonstrate evidence in favour of (incremental) informativeness (value relevance, information content) of pro forma earnings. On the other hand, they find evidence that small investors in particular tend to process pro forma earnings information in an undue fashion. In the light of evidence that demonstrates extensive use of pro forma earnings disclosures by large German corporations, this research literature lends support to recent concerns voiced by European securities regulators, and points at avenues for future research into capital markets reception of pro forma earnings disclosures both on the German capital market and in an EU/IFRS context.