Information Valence and Evaluations of Congress and Individual Legislators: Experimental Evidence Regarding Negativity Bias in Politics

Abstract

We use a survey experiment to assess whether negativity bias affects voters’ judgments of the legislative effectiveness of Congress (MCs) and Congress as an institution. These political actors allow us to evaluate voters’ perceptions of somewhat impersonal attitudinal objects (MCs) and very impersonal attitudinal objects (Congress as an institution). We find strong evidence of negativity bias, where individuals tend to place more weight upon negative information when evaluating MCs/Congress, and require less negative information to make an overall negative judgment of these actors. Specifically, our experiments indicate that less negative information is required to reach a judgment than is positive information. Similarly, our evidence suggests that voters are quicker to punish politicians and institutions for negative behavior than to reward them for positive behavior. In most cases, these effects are moderated by partisanship, with negativity bias being more severe against members of the partisan outgroup.