Information Transparency, Corporate Governance, And Convertible Bonds

Abstract

Information transparency is a popular topic in capital markets. A firms corporate governance policy, which influences its disclosure behavior and disclosure quality, influences the information transparency perceived in relation to that firm. It was previously understood that greater information asymmetry between investors and issuers/underwriters translates into a larger discount required to be offered in bond pricing by the issuing firm, to attract investors. In this paper, we numerically analyze: (a) the effect of the composition of the board structure on corporate information transparency under the code law system, and (b) the effect of information transparency on the initial return rate of convertible bonds. The results of our study revealed that the board structure affects corporate information disclosure policies under the code law system. Specifically, CEO duality tends to bring about lower information transparency, whereas better information transparency emanates from a higher proportion of independent directors. However, there is a lack of conclusive evidence to support the view that the shareholdings of directors and large shareholders are correlated with information transparency. We also show numerically that greater information transparency combined with lesser information asymmetry (between insiders and outsiders) leads to a lower initial return rate of convertible bonds.