Abstract
Japanese firms often attempt to influence the process and outcomes of wage negotiation by sharing confidential business information with their unions and employees through the joint consultation system. In this study, using a unique survey of Japanese joint consultation committees conducted in 1981, the author examines the effects of information sharing on the process and outcomes of wage negotiation. The results show that when firms engaged in increased information sharing, negotiation processes were shorter and easier, and unions tended to demand and accept lower wage increases. In contrast, a similar study performed in the United States found that information sharing increased labor's bargaining power.
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