Information matters: The effectiveness of mixed-ownership reform in mitigating financial constraints

Abstract

Due to the unhealthy principal-agent relationships prevalent in state-owned enterprises (SOEs), these enterprises often lack transparency in financial reporting and other critical information. Drawing on signaling theory, this study examines the impact of mixed-ownership reform (MOR) on financial constraints in Chinese SOEs. Using data from listed manufacturing SOEs between 2009 and 2019, we find that every 0.1 increase in the proportion of non-state shareholders, a proxy for MOR intensity, is associated with an average 2.34 ‰ reduction in financial constraints. This mitigation in constraints primarily arises from decreased information asymmetry between enterprises and the external capital market. Specifically, MOR promotes corporate information disclosure, which sends quality signals to investors, while simultaneously reinforcing corporate governance, which projects intention signals to capital markets. Notably, the effectiveness of MOR in alleviating financial constraints is more significant in capital-intensive and information-sensitive industries, as well as in central SOEs. These findings not only highlight the critical role of MOR in alleviating information asymmetry within SOEs, but also provide valuable insights for similar reforms aimed at advancing sustainable development of SOEs in other countries.