Information Manipulation, Coordination and Regime Change

Abstract

This paper studies endogenous information manipulation in games where a population canoverthrow a regime if individuals coordinate. The benchmark game has a unique equilibriumand in this equilibrium propaganda is effective if signals are sufficiently precise. Despite playing against perfectly rational individuals, a regime is able to manipulate information in a way that exploits heterogeneity in individual beliefs so that at equilibrium its chances of surviving are higher than they otherwise would be. This result is robust to alternative payoffs where the regime cares only for survival and to a number of alternative information structures,including situations where individuals have access to high-quality private information that is entirely uncontaminated by the regime.This paper studies endogenous information manipulation in games where a population can overthrow a regime if individuals coordinate. The benchmark game has a unique equilibrium and in this equilibrium propaganda is effective if signals are sufficiently precise. Despiteplaying against perfectly rational individuals, a regime is able to manipulate information in a way that exploits heterogeneity in individual beliefs so that at equilibrium its chances of surviving are higher than they otherwise would be. This result is robust to alternative payoffswhere the regime cares only for survival and to a number of alternative information structures, including situations where individuals have access to high-quality private information that is entirely uncontaminated by the regime.