Abstract
We examine whether the degree of selective disclosure (as measured by information leakage prior to managerial earnings guidance) of foreign firms with ADRs is different from that of U.S. firms. We find that there is no variation of leakage before earning guidance between ADRs and U.S. firms. This result is consistent with the prediction that, despite being exempt from Regulation FD, ADRs have sufficient incentives to avoid selective disclosure even without the regulatory enforcement. In addition, we attempt to determine whether the variation in selective disclosure among the foreign firms with ADRs is conditioned on the respective home country transparency and governance standards. We find that country-specific characteristics, such as corruption perception, economic freedom and the legal system origin, explain the variation in information leakage of ADRs.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
