Abstract

We suggest that philosophical accounts of epistemic effects of diversity have given insufficient attention to the relationship between demographic diversity and information elaboration (IE), the process whereby knowledge dispersed in a group is elicited and examined. We propose an analysis of IE that clarifies hypotheses proposed in the empirical literature and their relationship to philosophical accounts of diversity effects. Philosophical accounts have largely overlooked the possibility that demographic diversity may improve group performance by enhancing IE, and sometimes fail to explore the relationship between diversity and IE altogether. We claim these omissions are significant from both a practical and theoretical perspective. Moreover, we explain how the overlooked explanations suggest that epistemic benefits of diversity can depend on epistemically unjust social dynamics.

Highlights

  • The effect of diversity on science is an active topic of research among philosophers (Harding 2015; Intemann 2010; Kitcher 1990; Longino 1990, 2002; Muldoon 2013; Solomon 2001; Steel et al 2018; Zollman 2010)

  • A number of philosophers have developed formal models to study epistemic effects of cognitive diversity, but these models generally do not consider the effects of diversity on information elaboration (IE), which restricts their ability to study potential negative effects of diversity suggested by the double-edged sword and positive effects proposed by diversity can benefit information elaboration (DBIE) explanations

  • We claim that the relationship between demographic diversity and IE, while crucial to explanations found in the empirical literature, has not been adequately examined by philosophers

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Summary

Introduction

The effect of diversity on science is an active topic of research among philosophers (Harding 2015; Intemann 2010; Kitcher 1990; Longino 1990, 2002; Muldoon 2013; Solomon 2001; Steel et al 2018; Zollman 2010). DBIE explanations differ from the double-edged sword in claiming that demographic diversity can improve group performance even when it is not linked to the possession of distinctive information or perspectives related to the task, and that it can have positive, as well as negative, impacts on IE. A number of philosophers have developed formal models to study epistemic effects of cognitive diversity, but these models generally do not consider the effects of diversity on IE, which restricts their ability to study potential negative effects of diversity suggested by the double-edged sword and positive effects proposed by DBIE explanations. DBIE explanations imply that some epistemic benefits of diversity may depend on phenomena related to social injustices, such as stereotyping or discounting the testimony of out-group individuals We argue that this entails a more complex relationship between epistemic and justice-based rationales for diversity in science.

Explanations of diversity impacts
The double-edged sword
Information elaboration in philosophical models of diversity
Formal models
Diversity and objectivity
Conclusions
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