Abstract
We study the use of information control to mitigate hold-up risks. We identify a distinction between asymmetric information that creates an ex-ante investment incentive and asymmetric information that causes ex-post inefficiency, which then allows ex-post inefficiency to be eliminated without compromising the ex-ante investment incentive. We characterize the properties of the optimal information structure and the payoffs and welfare achievable with information control in the presence of hold-up risks.
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