Abstract
We theoretically and experimentally study voter behavior in a setting characterized by plurality rule and mandatory voting. Voters choose from three options. We are interested in the occurrence of strategic voting in an environment where Condorcet cycles may occur and focus on how information about the preference distribution affects strategic behavior. We also vary the relative importance of the second preferred option. Quantal response equilibrium analysis is used to analyze the game and derive predictions. Our results indeed show that strategic voting arises. Its extent depends on (i) information availability; (ii) the relative importance of the intermediate candidate; (iii) the electorate’s relative support for one’s preferred candidate; (iv) the relative position of the plurality-supported candidate in one’s preference ordering. Our results show that information serves as a coordination device where strategic voting does not harm the plurality-preferred candidate’s chances of winning.Electronic supplementary materialThe online version of this article (doi:10.1007/s10683-015-9443-2) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.
Highlights
Since its introduction in ancient Greece, democracy has always been associated with ‘government by the people’
Our results show that strategic voting is an important phenomenon and follows a pattern that to a large extent can be rationalized using the boundedly rational framework offered by Quantal Response Equilibria (QRE)
We study a voting environment characterized by the regular occurrence of Condorcet cycles in preferences
Summary
Since its introduction in ancient Greece, democracy has always been associated with ‘government by the people’. A sufficient condition for correct aggregation is that every voter casts a vote for her most preferred alternative. Voters may strategically vote for an alternative that is not ranked highest in their preference ordering (Farquharson 1969). The reason is that any election is a manifestation of individual preferences, and a multi-person decision process (Downs 1957; Riker 1982a; Blais and Nadeau 1996). In such a strategic interaction a voter may be more interested in optimizing the outcome than in stating her own preference
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