Abstract
An interested party who controls both the acquisition and the transmission of information may find it optimal to disclose her evidence even when it is unfavorable. At the same time, the public does not necessarily make better decisions when there is more disclosure. The model provides a rationale for voluntary adverse announcements such as product recalls and earning warnings and implications for disclosure laws.
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