Informal networks and religious intolerance: how clientelism incentivizes the discrimination of the Ahmadiyah in Indonesia

Abstract

Despite formal guarantees, minorities in new democracies often have difficulties securing their rights. Many scholars have focused on formal institutions to explain the quality and character of citizenship. In this paper, however, I argue that the ability of minorities to access the benefits and protections of citizenship is conditioned not only by formal guarantees, but through the clientelist networks through which political power is delivered. State actors will allow, or even actively participate in, the persecution of minority groups to win the support of brokers of key networks. I make this argument by looking at the restricted citizenship of Indonesia’s Ahmadiyah community, which has experienced high levels of discrimination in the democratic era. Through a paired comparison of two districts, Bandung city and Tasikmalaya district, I demonstrate that the ability of Ahmadis to access their rights and protections was shaped by the structure of clientelist networks. In districts where politicians relied on the brokerage of individuals with anti-Ahmadiyah preferences to win political office, Ahmadis had more difficulty accessing the rights and protections provided by formal citizenship.