Informal accountability, credible actions, and democratization in Taiwan

Abstract

How does informal government accountability relate to democratization? In this paper, we use multiple methodologies to show the relation between informal government accountability and democratization in Taiwan. Three results are relevant: First, a game-theoretic model reveals that both informal government accountability and formal democratization are pursued when economic conditions are weak to improve support for the government and extract political concessions for citizens. In particular, the game-theoretic model depicts informal accountability and democratization as outcomes from strategic interaction between the government and citizens where the timing of their preferences and credibility motivate the outcomes. Second, the descriptive studies and statistical analyses corroborate that informal government accountability and democratization occur when economic performance is weak; they also show that informal government accountability is precursory to the democratization process in Taiwan. Third, the evidence supports that informal government accountability leads to formal democratization when political tenure is jeopardized if the constituency-base is not expanded. The findings provide for a predictive model of political development that specifies how informal government accountability feasibly leads to democratization in Taiwan.