Abstract

This paper examines misconfidence (over- or underconfidence) and marriage proposal strategies in a two-sided search model with non-transferable utility. Single agents are vertically heterogeneous—there exists a ranking of marital charm (types). It is shown that there are two externalities to over- or underconfident behaviour: someone’s over- or underconfidence affects: (i) the duration of search for others who directly meet over- or underconfident agents; and (ii) the marriage decision of others who directly or indirectly meet over- or underconfident agents. Furthermore, these externalities prevent the lowest-type agents from marrying in an equilibrium.

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