Abstract
Influence analysis is the basic technology for predicting potentially hazardous behavior and determining the traceability of the hazardous behavior in the public security domain. Previous research has focused on maximizing the diffusion of the influence; however, little research has been performed on the method of minimizing the influence of negative information dissemination in networks. This paper proposes an influence minimization algorithm based on coordinated game. When the negative information is generated in the network and some initial nodes have been infected, the goal is to minimize the number of the final infected nodes by discovering and blocking the K uninfected nodes. First, the algorithm assumes that the behavior of the node propagating information depends on the coordination game with its neighboring nodes. Second, based on the local interaction model between the nodes, this paper quantifies the level of the influence of a node that is affected by its neighbors. Finally, the heuristic algorithm is used to identify the approximate optimal solution. The results of experiments performed on four real network datasets show that the proposed algorithm can suppress negative information diffusion better than the five considered existing algorithms.
Highlights
Social networks have become an important platform for information dissemination
In contrast to previous work, this paper proposes an influence minimization algorithm based on coordinated game (IMCG)
In the second stage of the IMCG algorithm, the influence minimization model determines the nodes in the network that will be infected under the influence of its infected neighbor nodes based on the node strategic choice, which is defined in the coordination game model
Summary
Social networks have become an important platform for information dissemination. When an individual makes a change, the individual with whom it is linked may make the same change [19], [20] Based on this concept, we build a basic coordination game model, as shown in FIGURE 1: Assuming there exist two individuals u and v, both will choose from between strategies 1 and 2, and the benefits are defined as follows: 1) Both u and v adopt strategy 1; u and v obtain the benefits of iu and iv. Negative information is generated in the social networks, and some initial nodes are infected These uninfected nodes will follow the strategy of the coordinated game model to decide whether to spread the negative information or not. When most of the neighbor nodes of an uninfected node u have been infected, satisfying equation (1), node u will make a decision to propagate the negative information, and it will subsequently be infected
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