Influence Mechanism of Industrial Agglomeration and Technological Innovation on Land Granting on Green Total Factor Productivity

Haoran Yang,Yaoben Lin,Yang Hu,Qun Wu,Xueqing Liu

doi:10.3390/su14063331

Abstract

The influence of land granting on green total factor productivity (GTFP) and its mechanisms remain under-explored. Based on dynamic spatial panel data of 30 provincial administrative regions in China from 2007 to 2017, this study attempts to establish the framework of a transmission mechanism among land granting, manufacturing agglomeration and technological innovation, and green total factor productivity, and measures their interactions by the mixed directional distance function and Global Malmquist–Luenberger index model containing undesirable output. Then, this paper empirically estimates the impacts of land granting, industrial agglomeration and technological innovation on green total factor productivity in China with a dynamic spatial mediating effect model. The results show that the development paradigm of China’s industrial green economy is characterized by path dependence, and industrial GTFP has a significant spatial effect. Local governments rely on low-price competition to obtain cost advantages and facilitate the agglomeration of local manufacturing industries, and promote the impact of negotiation on industrial GTFP through the mediating effect of manufacturing agglomeration. There exists a non-linear relationship between manufacturing agglomeration and industrial GTFP. The land acquired through negotiation has a promoting effect on green technology innovation, and will foster industrial GTFP through the intermediary effect of technological innovation. No obvious non-linear relationship is observed between technological innovation and industrial GTFP. The grant of “Tender, Auction and Listing” has no significant influence on the industrial GTFP, and the mediating conduction effect on the GTFP of industry is not established. Industrial structure, government management and infrastructure will significantly promote the improvement of industrial GTFP, while the level of transportation will inhibit the improvement of industrial GTFP. Through administrative intervention in low-production capacity departments, local governments can integrate regional resource endowments, give play to the comparative advantages of industries, and achieve industrial structure upgrades and core competitiveness, which will be conducive to the improvement of industrial GTFP. High-level transportation conditions increase energy consumption and greenhouse gas emissions in transportation operation, which makes no contribution to the enhancement of industrial GTFP.

Highlights

In Equation (1), at the 1% level, the negotiate transaction is significantly negative, and every 1% increase in the negotiated transaction price of a unit of sold area reduces the industrial green total factor productivity (GTFP) by 0.04%, implying that the negotiated transaction will obstruct the improvement in the industrial GTFP
The manufacturing agglomeration level rises by 0.04% for every 1% increase in the agreed sale price per unit selling area
This paper integrates manufacturing agglomeration, technological innovation, and industrial GTFP into a unified theoretical framework based on the various land granting modes of local governments, and systematically analyzes the transmission mechanism of the effect of land granting modes on industrial GTFP

Summary

Introduction

Land distribution is governed by the local land transfer system and political promotion incentive mechanism Under this circumstance, the local government creates behavioral reasoning for the benefit aimed at based on its own behavior motivation, during which the reasonable man concept underpins the administrative system of municipal governments. The local government creates behavioral reasoning for the benefit aimed at based on its own behavior motivation, during which the reasonable man concept underpins the administrative system of municipal governments They directly regulate the land transaction price, quantity, and resource allocation of industrial land, as well as obtaining more land transaction fees, in order to achieve industrial structure adjustments and upgrades [1], while generating self-interest motives for personal political rights and reputation.

Methods

Results

Conclusion