Abstract
Chapter 1 investigates what makes a vicious infinite regress vicious. It defends a pluralism according to which there is no common feature that vicious infinite regresses share in virtue of which they are vicious. Drawing on McTaggart’s paradox and Bradley’s regress, it further defends a relativism according to which the same infinite regress can be vicious relative to one background theory and benign relative to another, with no theory-neutral way to settle the question. Regresses of ontological dependence are examined, where each entity in the chain depends on the next, continuing to infinity, with no base layer of fundamentality. Arguments that Metaphysical Foundationalism must be true because such regresses of dependence are impossible are resisted.
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