Infinite regress in decision theory, philosophy of science, and formal epistemology

Abstract

Infinite regresses have had a mixed reception in philosophy. On the one hand, they are often quickly brushed aside as being unreasonable and even preposterous. If a position or a theory is shown to engender an infinite regress, that pretty well means the end of it: an argumentum ad infinitum is as good as a reductio ad absurdum. On the other hand, the alleged absurdity of infinite regresses has been a source of inspiration and the ground for far-reaching conclusions. It led to the requirement that a regress should come to a stop and thence to the verdict that there exist such things as a Prime Mover, a First Cause, a Highest Good, or a Causa Sui. Infinite regresses have been discussed in practically all branches of philosophy, not only in metaphysics and epistemology, but also in ethics, philosophy of mind, logic, and argumentation theory. In recent years, they have spurred a lively debate in traditional epistemology, where ‘infinitism’ (the idea that an infinite chain of epistemic justification is not prima facie absurd) is on its way to becoming a mature alternative to the traditional positions, foundationalism and coherentism. The papers in the present volume are about infinite regress in decision theory, philosophy of science, and formal epistemology. We are fortunate to have brought together a number of renowned philosophers and promising young scholars: John Barker is associate professor of Philosophy at the University of Illinois at Springfield, and chair of the Philosophy Department. His Ph.D. dissertation, defended in 1998 at Princeton University, is entitled ‘The Inconsistency Theory of Truth’. His areas of interest are philosophical logic and philosophy of language (especially paradoxes and inconsistencies) with side-interests in philosophy of mind and philosophy of science.