Abstract

<?tight?>Two-player games on graphs are widely studied in formal methods, as they model the interaction between a system and its environment. The game is played by moving a token throughout a graph to produce an infinite path. There are several common modes to determine how the players move the token through the graph; e.g., in turn-based games the players alternate turns in moving the token. We study the bidding mode of moving the token, which, to the best of our knowledge, has never been studied in infinite-duration games. The following bidding rule was previously defined and called Richman bidding. Both players have separate budgets , which sum up to 1. In each turn, a bidding takes place: Both players submit bids simultaneously, where a bid is legal if it does not exceed the available budget, and the higher bidder pays his bid to the other player and moves the token. The central question studied in bidding games is a necessary and sufficient initial budget for winning the game: a threshold budget in a vertex is a value t ∈ [0, 1] such that if Player 1’s budget exceeds t , he can win the game; and if Player 2’s budget exceeds 1 − t , he can win the game. Threshold budgets were previously shown to exist in every vertex of a reachability game, which have an interesting connection with random-turn games—a sub-class of simple stochastic games in which the player who moves is chosen randomly. We show the existence of threshold budgets for a qualitative class of infinite-duration games, namely parity games, and a quantitative class, namely mean-payoff games. The key component of the proof is a quantitative solution to strongly connected mean-payoff bidding games in which we extend the connection with random-turn games to these games, and construct explicit optimal strategies for both players.

Highlights

  • Two-player infinite-duration games on graphs are an important class of games as they model the interaction of a system and its environment

  • We show that parity bidding games are linearly-reducible to Richman games allowing us to obtain all the positive results from these games; threshold budgets exist, are unique, and computing them is no harder than for Richman games, i.e., the problem is in NP and coNP

  • Recall that in bidding parity games, we showed a classification for strongly-connected games; namely, the threshold budgets in all vertices are in {0, 1}, either Player 1 wins with every initial budget or Player 2 wins with every initial budget

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Summary

Introduction

Two-player infinite-duration games on graphs are an important class of games as they model the interaction of a system and its environment. We study the existence and computation of threshold budgets in parity and mean-payoff bidding games. We show that parity bidding games are linearly-reducible to Richman games allowing us to obtain all the positive results from these games; threshold budgets exist, are unique, and computing them is no harder than for Richman games, i.e., the problem is in NP and coNP We find this result quite surprising since for most other modes of moving, parity games are considerably harder than reachability games. We show that in a strongly-connected mean-payoff bidding game, the threshold budgets are in {0, 1}, again either Min “wins” or Max “wins” the game. The game ends once the token reaches a sink, and each sink is labeled with a pair of payoffs for the two players that do not necessarily sum up to 0 They show existence of subgame perfect equilibrium for every initial budget and a polynomial algorithm to compute it. Due to lack of space, most of the proofs appear in the full version [7]

Preliminaries
Objectives
Parity Bidding Games
Mean-Payoff Bidding Games
Solving Bidding Mean-Payoff Games
A Memoryless Optimal Strategy for Min
A Memoryless Optimal Strategy for Max
Discussion and Future
Full Text
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