Inference and metarepresentation: Ancient Greek ἠ̃ που as a constraint on higher-level explicatures

Abstract

In this paper, I present a relevance-theoretic approach to the Ancient Greek expression ἠ̃ που. Earlier accounts do not offer an integrated approach to its function, but only provide a synonym or some intuitive remarks. I argue that ἠ̃ που can be regarded as a constraint on the higher-level explicature – it instructs the hearer to regard the utterance it marks as a metarepresentation of someone else's thought process. In this way, the speaker marks utterances in which he is making assumptions about the implicated premise or the implicated conclusion which the hearer (or a third party) used as input for, or derived as output of, his inferential process. Broadly, ἠ̃ που can be encountered in two contexts – either where the speaker is making assumptions about what the hearer (or a third party) is thinking, or where the speaker is making assumptions about what the hearer should be thinking. Finally, I propose ‘surely’ and ‘no doubt’ as the most straightforward translations for ἠ̃ που.