Abstract
This paper shows whether and how Fehr and Schmidt’s (1999) inequity aversion model can be used to explain cooperations in a dynamic public goods game. We rst extend the originally static model into a dynamic one by assuming agents’ non-material concern covers expectations across all game rounds. This also allows us to redene a
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