Abstract
ABSTRACT Humean metaphysical views have often been criticised for leading to inductive scepticism. If there is no glue holding the world together, as the Humean believes, then there seems to be no basis on which to infer from past to future. However, Humeans have typically been unconcerned. After all, they say, everyone has a problem with induction. But if we look at the connection between induction and explanation, we can develop the problem of induction in a way that hits the Humean, but not the anti-Humean. The Humean faces an ‘internal’ problem with induction: scepticism about important inductive inferences naturally flows from their position in a way that it doesn’t for the anti-Humean. This is a major problem, perhaps a fatal one, for the Humean.
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