Indonesia´s Foreign Policy under Abdurrahman Wahid: Radical or Status Quo State?$^{1}$

Abstract

When Abdurrahman Wahid first came to power in Indonesia there was some alarm over the direction of Indonesia's foreign policy. However, the reality is that Abdurrahman's foreign policy has been more orthodox than some of his earlier rhetoric might have indicated. Indonesia needs the developed world as a source of funding to revive its economy. In terms of foreign diplomacy, Indonesia has successfully gained reassurances from the international community of its territorial integrity. ASEAN also remains central to Jakarta's foreign policy outlook. The issue of East Tim or is still a crucial sticking point between Indonesia and a number of Western countries. The United States, in particular, is reluctant to push Indonesia too far as it is believed that the Abdurrahman presidency is the least desirable alternative in domestic and foreign policy terms. Introduction Since the fall of Soeharto in May 1998, the East Timor crisis of 1999, and the emergence of Abdurrahman Wahid (or Gus Dur) as Indonesian President, there has been much press and diplomatic corps speculation about the likely direction of Indonesia's foreign policy. In particular, there has been an expressed concern that Indonesia is turning away from the West, after the bitterness over East Timor, and seeking to forge a common front with some of the leading nations in Asia. This has become known in the popular media as Gus Dur's card -- whatever this might mean. Since assuming office, President Abdurrahman Wahid has made a number of statements about the direction of Indonesia's foreign policy. With any leader -- and with Gus Dur in particular -- it might be imprudent to take all of these statements at face value. It is necessary to try to determine what is personality-driven -- that is to say what is driven by the person of the President -- and what is institutionally-driven. Although Soeharto's New Order is now part of history, it is important to examine some of the main themes of Indonesia's foreign policy in the not too distant past as this will shed some light on recent events. While it is true that Indonesia under President Abdurrahman may be looking to lessen its dependence on the West, what is seen as a break with Soeharto's supposed pro-Western stance tends to accentuate differences that may not exist in reality. Indicative of the literature that assumes that Soeharto was completely pro-Western, or even a Western lackey, is the fairly recent article by Noam Chomsky entitled, Indonesia, the Master Card in Washington's Hand. [2] This kind of statement tends to obscure the fact that Indonesia is a decidedly non-aligned state with aspirations to Third World leadership. Links with the West, which had held economic and diplomatic value for Soeharto's New Order, were only part of the equation. Strengthening ties with other developing countries is not unique to the current In donesian administration. Therefore, Abdurrahman's activism in the Third World -- with regard to trying to forge greater links with China and India, or recent noises about a visit to Iraq -- must be seen in that light. Another scholar has remarked that: Indonesia is now seeking to play 'the Asia card' in its relations with the West. In other words, it's back to the days of Sukarno's Indonesia of the 1960s. Who said, the future doesn't resemble the past. [3] It is the contention of this article that President Abdurrahman Wahid's foreign policy is more continuous with that of the Soeharto administration than this sort of quotation would seem to suggest. Indonesia wishes to continue to play its part as a good international citizen, and it is too early to predict emerging radicalism in Indonesia's foreign policy. The core concerns remain, including a stable international order; the desire for an enhanced reputation; the need to have strong relations with the neighbouring ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) states; the need for support from the global community for its existing borders (notably with regard to Aceh and Papua); the need for funding from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the wider international community; and the need for trade and investment, principally from the developed world. …